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ARTICLE 
MAKING THE CRUCIAL 
CONNECTION: A PROPOSED 
THREAT HEARSAY EXCEPTION 
DONNA MEREDITH MATTHEWS· 
To the man or woman on the street, the relevance 
and probative value of such evidence is both 
obvious and compelling, especially those state-
ments made just days before the homicide. It 
seems only just and right that a crime victim's 
own words be heard, especially in the court 
where the facts and circumstances of her demise 
are to be presented. However, the laws and ap-
pellate court decisions that must be applied by 
the trial court hold otherwise.1 
* J.D. expected 1997, University of Oregon. I want to thank Laird 
Kirkpatrick for his many valuable comments on the progressive drafts of this 
article, for the initial inspiration that led to my writing it, and for his support 
and appreciation of my work. I am also indebted to Carolina Forell and Lisa 
Kloppenberg for their comments and insights. 
1. Judge Lance A. Ito in The People of the State of California v. Orenthal 
James Simpson, explaining an evidentiary ruling denying admission of Nicole 
Brown Simpson's statements. Ito went on to say, "In factual situations distressing-
ly similar to the assumed facts of this case, the California Supreme Court has 
given clear guidance to the trial court. The courts in People v. Arcega (1982) 32 
C.3d 503, and People v. Ireland (1969) 70 C.2d 522, have clearly held that it is 
reversible error to admit the hearsay statements by a homicide victim expressing 
fear of the defendant, even when made on the very day of the homicide. (See also 
People v. Ruiz (1988) 44 C.3d 589, 607-610) The Evidence Code Section 1250 ex-
ception argued by prosecution on the theory of 'learned helplessness' is not sup-
ported by the offer of proof and the defense has not raised any issue concerning 
Brown Simpson's acts of conduct preceding the homicide. State v. Simpson, 1995 
WL 21768, at *3 (Cal. Super. Doc., Jan. 18, 1995). 
117 
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This striking statement from Judge Ito in State v. Simpson 
highlights a persistent flaw in the rules of evidence. That is, a 
victim's statements to friends, family, counselor, or battered 
women's shelter are frequently inadmissible in court, unless 
they fit into one of the existing hearsay exceptions. In the 
Simpson case ruling, the victim's "words" that were not "heard" 
included statements by Nicole Brown Simpson that she was 
deathly afraid of O.J. Simpson, that he had threatened her, 
and that he had said if he couldn't have her, no one could.2 
Nicole's "testimony" against her ex-husband was excluded, 
barred by the hearsay rules. When a trial judge feels impelled 
to explain and apologize for evidence rulings, it signals that 
something is seriously awry. Furthermore, it signals that the 
rules should be changed to reconcile evidentiary decisions with 
what seems "only just and right." 
A victim of domestic violence who is ultimately murdered 
cannot speak for herself' because she is dead, killed in part 
because the law is seemingly helpless to intervene on her be-
half. Almost invariably, a victim of domestic homicide4 en-
dures years of hidden violence and terror, within the private 
sphere of the home, before she is killed.5 Typically, when she 
finally realizes that she must leave and finds the strength to 
do so, the abuser cannot tolerate her escape from control, so he 
kills her.6 Because his threats and assaults have predominant-
2. Id. at 25. 
3. I use "she" for the victim and "he" for the perpetrator because the great 
majority of domestic violence is perpetrated by a man against a woman. This is 
not meant to devalue the significance of violence within same sex domestic rela-
tionships nor of the rare cases in which a woman abuses her male domestic part-
ner. Both of these situations should be deemed included within the gendered 
terms "she" and "he." 
4. I use the term "domestic homicide" because, much of the time, these mur-
ders occur after the woman has left the marital or pseudo-marital relationship, 
and because these homicides belong on the continuum of what is commonly termed 
"domestic violence." Some courts have carved out specific exceptions to admit state-
ments by the victim regarding threats, fear, and sometimes abuse in what they 
call "marital homicide" cases, which some of these courts have explicitly held to 
apply to live-in relationships. See e.g., State v. Young, 852 P.2d 510 (Kan. 1993). 
However, the term "domestic homicide" seems more accurate and intrinsically 
inclusive of live-in relationships, so I use it here. 
5. See, e.g., Martha R. Mahoney, Legal Images of Battered Women: Redefining 
The Issue of Separation, 90 MICH. L. REV. 1 (1991); FEMINIST PERSPECTIVES ON 
WIFE ABUSE (Kersti Yllo & Michele Bograd, eds., 1988); LENORE E. WALKER, THE 
BATTERED WOMAN (1979); LENORE E. WALKER, TERRIFYING LOVE (1979). 
6. Martha R. Mahoney, Women's Lives, Violence, and Agency in THE PuBLIC 
2
Golden Gate University Law Review, Vol. 27, Iss. 2 [1997], Art. 2
http://digitalcommons.law.ggu.edu/ggulrev/vol27/iss2/2
1997] PROPOSED THREAT HEARSAY EXCEPTION 119 
ly occurred in secret, she has no witnesses: Her only witness is 
herself, and she is dead. 
Often, the words the domestic homicide victim has spoken 
to others cannot be heard in the trial of her accused murderer. 
Courts admit certain statements by victims when they fit into 
existing categorical exceptions to the hearsay rule. However, 
when they do admit threat hearsay, many courts appear to 
contort the rules in order to do so, and which statements they 
find admissible varies significantly from state to state.7 Fur-
ther, most threat hearsay comes in under the state-of-mind 
exception to the hearsay rule, which does not admit the state-
ments as substantive evidence and subjects them to limiting 
instructions.s Many courts apply the hearsay rules more cate-
gorically and simply bar the victim's declarations as inadmissi-
ble hearsay or character evidence.9 
In any event, the murdered woman can no longer speak 
for herself, and without her statement a killer may go free or 
be convicted of a lesser offense. Yet, if she had been almost-
fatally attacked, but had not seen her attacker, the threats 
would be admissible if offered by the victim against him at 
tria1.10 The effect of this evidentiary loophole is reminiscent of 
the cynical adage that if you hit someone with your car, back 
up to make sure they're dead (to avoid the extensive pain and 
suffering damages). At a minimum, absent admission of the 
victim's statements as substantive evidence, the common pat-
NATURE OF PRIVATE VIOLENCE (Martha Albertson Fineman & Roxanne Mykitiuk, 
Eds. 1994). These killings are generally extremely brutal-often by bludgeoning, 
multiple stab wounds, or repeated close-range gunshots. A five-year study in NEw 
York City revealed a similar pattern of brutality in domestic homicides. Pam 
Belluck, A Woman's Killer is Very Often Her Partner, A Study Finds, N.Y. TIMES 
(Nat1 Ed.), Mar. 31, 1997, at A12. The leader of the study noted that women 
"are very likely to be punched and hit and burned and thrown out of windows" in 
killings that "spoke of enormous rage." [d. See also, Part II, infra, and cases 
cited therein. 
7. See discussion of cases, Part II, infra. 
S. Under FED. R. EVID. S03(3), and its state counterparts, statements of the 
declarant concerning his or her present mental attitudes and intentions or physical 
condition are admissible; however the rule expressly excludes "a statement of 
memory or belief to prove the fact remembered or believed." FED. R. EVlD. S03(3). 
9. See, e.g., cases discussed in Part II, infra. See generally CHRISTOPHER B. 
MUELLER & LAIRD C. KIRKPATRICK, EVIDENCE §§ 4.11, 4.20-22, S.39 (1994). 
10. Statements by the party constitute admissions by a party-opponent and are 
not hearsay when offered against him. FED. R. EVID. S01(d)(2). 
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tern of domestic violence escalating from abuse to death 
threats and then homicide will never be properly accounted for 
in the legal paradigm.11 To correct this situation, I argue that 
the rules of evidence be amended to create an exception for the 
"victim's own words" to be heard. 
This article discusses how courts admit and exclude threat 
hearsay in the domestic homicide context and suggests an 
approach for admission of such evidence. After analyzing the 
current evidentiary status of the victim's statements regarding 
threats in homicide cases in which an apparently abusive 
spouse/partner is accused, I argue for adoption of a new hear-
say exception that permits systematic admission of victims' 
statements concerning threats and violence by the accused. 
The victim can no longer speak. for herself because she has 
been killed, often because the law is apparently helpless to 
intervene on her behalf, even when asked. Consequently, the 
legal system must change to admit her words, even if it is too 
late to save her. While such statements would not, and should 
not, suffice to convict someone of homicide, they may well 
provide the critical piece of cumulative evidence that convinces 
a jury that the accused is guilty beyond a reasonable doubt. 
Part I provides an overview of domestic violence and why 
the victim's statements should be accorded special status in 
domestic homicide cases. This part describes the pattern of 
domestic violence that escalates into serious threats and finally 
death, particularly when the victim tries' to escape. As a re-
cent, well-known example, I examine the treatment of threat 
hearsay in State v. Simpson. 12 Finally, this part discusses re-
lated hearsay challenges and what commentators have pro-
posed to allow their admission despite the hearsay rule. 
Part II surveys the ways courts admit or exclude threat 
hearsay under the current rules of evidence and then examines 
11. In reviewing available cases that involve rulings on threat hearsay, the 
overwhelming impression is how uncannily similar are the fact patterns. Although 
individual circumstances vary, these cases uniformly involve a pattern of prior 
domestic violence, an attempt to leave the abusive relationship or otherwise escape 
the partner's control, overt or covert threats by the partner, and then a brutal 
homicide. See, e.g., cases discussed infra Part II, and accompanying notes. 
12. 1995 WL 21768 (Cal. Super. Doc., Jan. 18, 1995). 
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the limitations inherent in the inconsistent and restrictive 
application of the existing hearsay exceptions. Each exception 
courts apply in this context is analyzed and then explicated by 
discussion of domestic homicide cases in which that exception 
is used to admit or exclude hearsay threat evidence. The par-
ticular focus is on those situations where threats were made in 
secret and subsequently disclosed to apparently trustworthy 
witnesses prior to institution of any legal proceedings against 
the defendant. The central question is whether, and to what 
extent, the existing rules achieve the purpose of the hearsay 
rules and of justice in the domestic homicide context. 
Part III recommends that the Federal Rules of Evidence be 
amended to provide a hearsay exception for statements by 
domestic homicide victims regarding threats and violence by 
the accused. This part briefly reviews various broad critiques 
and proposals for reform of the hearsay rules and analyzes 
each in terms of how it might affect admission of threat evi-
dence. I conclude that, while some of these proposals might 
lead to admission of threat hearsay, it is unlikely that such 
sweeping reforms will be adopted or that, if adopted, they 
would provide the necessary recognition of the validity of the 
victim's words. Instead, I propose a specific hearsay exception 
for statements by homicide victims concerning fear of or 
threats by the accused, limited to situations in which prior 
incidents of abuse or threats can be demonstrated. 
I. SILENCING THE VICTIM - WHAT'S WRONG WITH 
EXCLUDING FUTURE THREAT EVIDENCE 
Studies of domestic homicides find a clear pattern of abuse 
escalating into death threats and finally murder-particularly 
when the victim finally attempts to leave or in fact leaves her 
abuser. 13 Martha Mahoney calls this "separation assault," 
pointing out that more than half of domestic homicides are 
committed after the victim left the relationship, "when the 
batterer's quest for control becomes lethal.,,14 Before she was 
killed, the victim may have told others that her-usually es-
tranged or former-partner threatened to kill her, or that she 
13. See, e.g., ANN JONES, NEXT TIME, SHE'LL BE DEAD 87-96 (1994). 
14. Mahoney, supra note 6, at 79. 
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was afraid that he would kill her. Yet her statements to others 
about what her abuser said or did are hearsay, and therefore 
inadmissible unless they fit one of the categorical exceptions to 
the hearsay rule. 
Even though the victim, if alive, could give direct testimony 
about those threats because they would qualify as admissions 
of a party opponent,15 others cannot testify about what she 
claims that he said or did. Thus, unless someone witnesses the 
partner's threats or the victim's statements fit into an existing 
hearsay exception, the victim is truly silenced by her abuser 
because her words cannot be introduced in court. Exclusion of 
this evidence creates a vital gap in the case against the abuser, 
because, absent the threat evidence, juries often do not make 
the crucial connection between domestic violence and domestic 
homicide. 16 
In contrast, a number of commentators argue that the 
experience of the victim should be given special status. This 
special status should be accorded because common myths 
about domestic abuse seriously affect jury perceptions in 
abuse-homicide cases. 17 Further, the victim is in fact the best 
witness against the perpetrator but he has "procured" her 
absence from testifying. IS More broadly, the victim should be 
given particular credence because the continuing isolation of 
and violence against women in the domestic sphere constitutes 
a serious societal problem that must be addressed on various 
fronts.19 Through its failure to take domestic violence serious-
ly, including exclusion of a domestic homicide victim's crucial 
15. A statements is not hearsay if it is offered against a party and is the 
party's own statement in either an individual or a representative capacity or a 
statement of which the party has manifested an adoption or belief in its truth. 
FED. R. EVID. 801(d)(2). 
16. See Melanie Frager Griffith, Battered Woman Syndrome: A Tool for 
Batterers?, 64 FORDHAM L. REV. 141 (1995). 
17. See note 47 infra, and accompanying text. 
18. Mahoney, supra note 5, at 58 n.273; Mahoney supra note 6, at 74-79. 
19. Barbara Hart, Beyond the "Duty to Warn": A Therapist's "Duty to Protect" 
Battered Women and Children, in FEMINIST PERSPECTIVES ON WIFE ABUSE 234 
(Kersti Yllo & Michele Bogard eds., 1988). See generally JONES, supra note 13; 
THE PuBLIC NATURE OF PRNATE VIOLENCE (Martha Albertson Fineman & Roxanne 
Mykitiuk, Eds. 1994); MURRAY A. STRAUS, RICHARD J. GELLES & SUZANNE K. 
STEINMETZ, BEHIND CLOSED DOORS: VIOLENCE IN THE AMERICAN FAMILY 221-252 
(Anchor Books, 1981); WALKER, THE BATTERED WOMAN, supra note 5, at 185-250. 
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testimony, the legal system implicitly condones the behavior of 
men who batter and kill "their women" and fails to give these 
women the protection of the law. 
An abuse victim is silenced in part because a shroud of 
secrecy and misunderstanding still surrounds domestic vio-
lence, and because the dualistic personality traits common to 
many batterers create a false public image of the relation-
ship.20 In general, batterers who ultimately kill display an 
obsessive need to control all aspects of the marriage, including 
what outsiders observe,21 and they will make "extraordinary 
efforts" to prevent the domestic partner from leaving.22 Many 
batterers characteristically have dual or contradictory person-
ality traits, which are often manifested in being charming and 
personable to others, yet cruel and violent to their domestic 
partners.23 Dr. Lenore Walker, a nationally recognized expert 
on domestic violence, estimates that only 20 percent of 
batterers are violent outside the private, domestic context, so 
the violence remains obscured or invisible to outside observ-
ers.24 Thus, the violence is largely sequestered from public 
view and subsequently disregarded by the legal system. 
The sharp distinction between the public and private demeanor 
of the batterer makes a victim of domestic violence the best 
judge of the abuser's violent potential.25 Because the violence 
is largely hidden from public view, the victim is the primary, 
often only, witness to the violence. Further, the abuser's victim 
is most able to assess his dangerousness, because she has a 
heightened sensitivity to how and when the violence might 
occur.26 Although the abuse victim's perception is not infalli-
ble, "the instrumental nature of his violence makes her, the 
20. See generally WALKER, THE BATTERED WOMAN, supra note 5; JONES, supra 
note 13; KATHLEEN H. HOFELLER, Ph.D, BATTERED WOMEN, SHATTERED LIVES 
49-79 (1983). 
21. JONES, supra note 13, at 89-95. Jones convincingly likens the patterns of 
abuse and control in an abusive relationship to methods of coercion used in brain-
washing and breaking prisoners of war. [d. at 89-92. 
22. Frager Griffith, supra note 16. 
23. [d. 
24. WALKER, THE BATTERED WOMAN, supra note 5, at 36; HOFELLER, supra 
note 20, at 85. 
25. Mahoney, supra note 5, at 58. 
26. Hart, supra note 19, at 240. 
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target, the closest observer.,,27 That is, the victim has a great-
er necessity to measure her abuser's violent potential than any 
outside observer could have. In essence, the victim holds 
unique and compelling evidence, so the legal system should 
give special credence to her perception. Thus, courts should 
consider a victim's statements regarding death threats by and 
fear of the accused as some of the most relevant and probative 
evidence available in a prosecution for her murder. 
A. A CASE IN POINT: THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA V. ORENTHAL 
JAMES SIMPSON 
A few days after the not-guilty verdict in State v. 
Simpson,28 a woman juror asserted her belief that the prose-
cution had wasted a huge amount of time in the case by bela-
boring the domestic abuse evidence-that this was about mur-
der, not domestic abuse.29 She simply could not make the con-
nection. Might her, and the other jurors', view have changed if 
the prosecution had been allowed to present its evidence of 
Nicole Brown Simpson's call to a women's shelter only four 
days before her murder, in which she expressed her fear of 
O.J.?30 Of Nicole's statements to friends and family that she 
knew O.J. would kill her, and that he would get away with 
it?31 Of Nicole's counseling sessions in which she disclosed her 
fear of O.J. and that he had threatened to kill her?32 Of 
Nicole's statement that O.J. had told her, "If I can't have you, 
no one can,,?33 
That threat and fear evidence was excluded, as was much 
27. [d. 
28. 1995 WL 21768 (Cal. Super. Doc., Jan. 18, 1995). 
29. NATIONAL PuBLIC RADIO, Morning Edition, October 17, 1995. 
30. State v. Simpson, 1995 WL 21768 (Cal. Super. Doc., Jan. 18, 1995) (Ruling 
on In Limine Motion to Exclude Evidence of Domestic Discord). See also, Laurie L. 
Levenson, Abuse By Any Other Name: The Admissibility of Domestic Violence Evi-
dence in The Simpson Case, 1995 WL 5632 (O.J. Comm., Jan. 9, 1995); Susan B. 
Jordan, The Rules of Evidence: Will The Jury Hear The Whole Domestic Violence 
Story?, 1995 WL 6018 (O.J. Comm., Jan. 10, 1995); Susan B. Jordan, What's Going 
On Here? The Hearings on Domestic Violence, 1995 WL 12153 (O.J. Comm., Jan. 
16, 1995). 




Golden Gate University Law Review, Vol. 27, Iss. 2 [1997], Art. 2
http://digitalcommons.law.ggu.edu/ggulrev/vol27/iss2/2
1997] PROPOSED THREAT HEARSAY EXCEPTION 125 
other evidence of recurring violent and abusive incidents in the 
relationship. The court did admit some "prior acts" evidence 
regarding Simpson's "prior assaults upon Nicole Brown 
Simpson ... as to the issues of motive, intent, plan and identi-
ty,"34 as well as statements regarding Nicole's fear of Simpson 
that fit into the excited utterance exception.35 The court ad-
mitted other abuse evidence "to establish a pattern of con-
duct ... indicating an escalating course of conduct indicative of 
the motive, planning, intent and identity of the assailant in 
the homicide of Nicole Brown Simpson and Ronald 
Goldman."36 Nicole's statements to friends and family, to her 
counselor, and to staff at a women's shelter appear to be con-
sistent with demonstrating such "an escalating course of con-
duct." Nonetheless, the court held that they did not fit an ex-
isting hearsay exception so were inadmissible in the trial for 
her murder.37 
While admission of Nicole's statements might not have 
affected the outcome of the Simpson case-with its rogue police 
officer and tainted investigation, its rich and famous defendant 
with a $10 million legal defense fund, and its highly charged 
political and racial atmosphere-it is possible that the jurors 
may have been able to make the connection between the pat-
tern of domestic violence and domestic homicide. At a mini-
mum, perhaps the Simpson juror quoted above would not have 
so glibly disregarded the cumulative evidence of violence, 
abuse, extreme jealousy, and stalking, and how that evidence 
supported conviction of a "heroic" man like O.J. Simpson for 
brutally slashing his ex-wife and her male friend when she 
finally escaped his control. And perhaps the viewing public 
would begin to make the connection as well and to take domes-
tic violence more seriously. 
34. [d. at *1-2. 
35. For example, the recording of Nicole Brown Simpson's 911 call made while 
O.J. Simpson was breaking in her door and screaming was admitted under the 
excited utterance and present sense impression exceptions; the entire tape was 
admitted, including Brown Simpson's expressions of fear. [d. 
36. State v. Simpson, 1995 WL 21768, at *1-2. 
37. [d. 
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B. THE CYCLE OF VIOLENCE 
Only recently has American society begun to treat private 
violence against women as a matter of public concern.38 The 
effect of domestic violence on women, both psychologically and 
physically, remains inadequately addressed in society and in 
law. The escalating pattern of domestic abuse is not well un-
derstood by most people. Somehow, domestic violence is still 
generally viewed as anomalous behavior that is best handled 
in private, within the family, and which was likely provoked by 
the victim herself. 39 Yet battering is the main cause of injury 
to women, more than injuries from auto accidents, rapes, and 
muggings combined.40 Further, extensive studies have found 
that one-third to one-half of all female homicide victims are 
killed by a domestic partner, often after she decides to leave 
the relationship.41 
Research and anecdotal evidence indicates that domestic 
abusers exist throughout all levels of society and that they 
cannot be easily spotted by outsiders. That is, "[b]attering 
occurs in all social groupings . . . cross[ing] all racial, ethnic, 
socioeconomic, religious, age and geographic boundaries."42 In 
38. See, e.g., Steffani J. Saitow, Battered Woman Syndrome: Does the "Reason-
able Battered Woman n Exist?, 19 NEW ENG. J. ON CRIM. & CN. CONFINEMENT 329 
(1993); Frager Griffith, supra note 16. 
39. Id. 
40. Jane O'Reilly, Wife Beating: The Silent Crime, TIME, September 5, 1983. 
See also Belluck, supra no~ 6 ("More women in New York City are killed by their 
husbands or boyfriends than in robberies, disputes, sexual assaults, drug violence, 
random attacks or any other crime ... where the relationship between the murderer 
and victim is known."). Further, the New York City study found that the number 
of domestic homicides increased during the time period studied, while total crime 
and murders of women decreased. Id. 
41. F.B.I. UNIFORM CRIME REPORTS (1988) (one-third to one-halO; American 
Medical Association, AM. J. OF PuB. HEALTH 70:65-66 (1989) (fifty percent); 
Belluck, supra note 6 ("nearly half of the women [in the New York City study]" 
compared with the national figure of 40 percent). In a detailed study of police and 
FBI records and other supplemental materials, Jacquelin Campbell found that FBI 
and police statistics under-report spousal homicides. Jacquelin C. Campbell, If I 
Can't Have You, No One Can: Power and Control in Homicide of Female Partners 
in FEMICIDE: THE POLITICS OF WOMAN KILLING 100-101 (Jill Radford & Diana 
Russell, Eds., 1992). 
42. NANCY HUTCHINGS, THE VIOLENT FAMILY: VICTIMIZATION OF WOMEN, CHIL-
DREN AND ELDERS 73 (1988); But see Belluck, supra note 6 (study of women 
killed in New York City between 1990 and 1994 found that two-thirds of domestic 
homicides were in the poorest areas of the city and three-quarters of the victims 
10
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fact, "[b]ecause domestic violence is so widespread, it is unlike-
ly that there is one 'personality type' which is characteristic of 
all violent men. Nevertheless, it is still possible to identify 
some common factors."43 These factors include insecurity and 
extreme jealousy; an excessive need to control the partner and 
to prevent her from leaving; and a dual or contradictory per-
sonality characterized by an ability to be charming to others 
yet cruel to his partner.44 
Although such evidence would be inadmissible "profile" 
evidence if introduced in court to show that the accused acted 
in accordance with that profile (or failed to do SO),45 discussion 
of it here helps us to understand the pattern of violence. Fur-
ther, such evidence may be useful in establishing a foundation 
for admitting threat hearsay and could potentially be used in 
educating jurors about domestic violence and homicide. 
The legal system has done little to acknowledge the con-
nection between battering and domestic homicide. This 
marginalization of domestic violence both leads to a failure of 
peopl~including jurors-to understand the effects and pat-
terns of domestic violence and results in continuing isolation 
and legal disregard of the victims.46 Understanding the associ-
ation between domestic violence and domestic homicide is not 
about predicting that a particular individual will murder his 
wife, or even that a particular abusive spouse did in fact kill 
his wife. Rather, discerning the pattern of escalating, often 
secret, violence may show motive, planning, intent, or identity 
of the assailant, as some courts already recognize.47 Acknowl-
edging that this pattern of violence may well have culminated 
were African American or Hispanic). 
43. HOFELLER, supra note 20, at 83. 
44. 1d. at 83-87. See also Frager Griffith, supra note 16. 
45. Neil Vidmar & Regina A. Schuller, Juries and Expert Evidence: Social 
Framework Testimony, 52 AUT LAw & CONTEMP. PROBS. 133 (1989). See generally, 
MUELLER & KIRKPATRICK, supra note 9. 
46. Various articles discuss the misconceptions and myths commonly held 
about domestic violence and their effect on juries. See, e.g., Charles P. Ewing & 
Moss Aubrey, Battered Women and Public Opinion: Some Realities About the Myth, 
2 J. FAM. VIOLENCE 257 (1987); Mary Dodge & Edith Greene, Juror and Expert 
Conceptions of Battered Women, 6 VIOLENCE & VICTIMS 271 (1991). 
47. See, e.g., Thomas v. State, 886 S.W.2d 388 (Tex. App. 1994); Duvall v. 
State, 825 P.2d 621 (Ok. Crim. App. 1991); United States v. Elmore, 33 M.J. 387 
(Milit. App. 1991); State v. Hulsing, 825 P.2d 1027 (Colo. App. 1991). 
11
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in homicide may also provide a basis for admitting the victim's 
statements about threats and intimidation by her partner. This 
then may help to free the victims-both living and dead-from 
silence and isolation within the violent relationship. 
There are a few analogous contexts in which justice seems to 
call for specific adaptations of the hearsay rules: where a wit-
ness has been made unavailable to testify by the accused, and 
where the victim of child sexual abuse is the only witness. I 
discuss these below, to illustrate some of the underlying moral 
grounds for admission of threat hearsay and to consider pro-
posals for hearsay exceptions that may be applicable in the 
threat hearsay context as well. 
C. ANALOGY TO PROCUREMENT OF WITNESS UNAVAILABILITY -
WAIVER BY MISCONDUCT 
Many courts contend with a related hearsay problem, that 
of how to admit testimony when the defendant has procured a 
witness's unavailability.48 Courts admit hearsay against a 
party, including a criminal defendant, who is found to have 
wrongfully caused the unavailability of the hearsay declarant, 
under the residual hearsay exception.49 Courts apply the 
hearsay rule more expansively when they determine that the 
defendant has made the witness unavailable,50 generally hold-
48. See Paul T. Markland, The Admission of Hearsay Evidence Where Defen-
dant Misconduct Causes the Unavailability of a Prosecution Witness, 43 AM. U. L. 
REV. 995 (1994), for an overview of these cases and the arguments in favor of 
admitting the witness's testimony. 
49. See, e.g., Steele v. Taylor, 684 F.2d 1193, 1201-02 (6th Cir. 1982), cert. 
denied 460 U.S. 1053 (1983), rehearing denied 461 U.S. 940 (1983). See generally 
MUELLER & KIRKPATRICK, supra note 9 at § 8.66. Under the residual or "catchall" 
hearsay exception, a statement not specifically covered by any of the categorical 
exceptions to the hearsay rule 
but having equivalent circumstantial guarantees of trust-
worthiness [is admissible] if the court determines that (A) 
the statement is offered as evidence of a material fact; 
(B) the statement is more probative on the point for 
which it is offered than any other evidence which the 
proponent can procure through reasonable efforts; and (C) 
the general purposes of these rules and the interests of 
justice will best be served by admission of the statement 
into evidence. FED. R. EVID. 803(24). 
50. MICHAEL H. GRAHAM, HANDBOOK OF FEDERAL EVIDENCE § 802 n.4 (3d ed. 
12
Golden Gate University Law Review, Vol. 27, Iss. 2 [1997], Art. 2
http://digitalcommons.law.ggu.edu/ggulrev/vol27/iss2/2
1997] PROPOSED THREAT HEARSAY EXCEPTION 129 
ing that by doing so the defendant has waived the right to 
raise hearsay objections to admission of that witness's out-of-
court statements or to assert violation of the Confrontation 
Clause of the Sixth Amendment.51 This common-law waiver 
requires a preliminary finding-generally by a preponderance 
of the evidence, although some courts have held it to a clear 
and convincing standard-that the defendant did in fact pro-
cure the unavailability of the witness, after commencement of 
the proceedings. 52 In part, underlying these rulings is the be-
lief that disclosure of relevant information at a trial is of para-
mount interest. 53 Thus, any significant interference with that 
interest, except by exercising a legal right to object, is a wrong-
ful act. 
In this context, courts traditionally limit admissible hear-
say to prior grand jury testimony, although some courts have 
extended the admission to other statements. Commentators 
argue that complete waiver should operate to admit all such 
statements. 54 In line with this approach, the Rules Advisory 
Committee recently proposed a "waiver by misconduct" rule, 
1991), citing Steele v. Taylor, 684 F.2d 1193, 1201-02 (6th Cir. 1982), cert. denied 
460 U.S. 1053 (1983), rehearing denied 461 U.S. 940 (1983). 
51. See Markland, supra note 48, at 997. 
52. Compare United States v. Thevis, 665 F.2d 616 (5th Cir. 1982), rehearing 
denied 671 F.2d 1379 (5th Cir. 1982), cert. denied 456 U.S. 1008 (1982) (applying 
the clear and convincing standard), with United States v. Mastrangelo, 693 F.2d 
269, 273 (2d Cir. 1982), on remand 561 F.Supp. 1114 (E.D.N.Y. 1983), affd 722 
F.2d 13 (2d Cir. 1983), cert. denied 467 U.S. 1204 (1984) ("We see no reason to 
impose upon the government more than the usual burden of proof by a preponder-
ance of the evidence where waiver by misconduct is concerned."). 
53. GRAHAM, supra note 50, at § 802. 
54. United States v. Mastrangelo, 693 F.2d 269, 273 (2d Cir. 1982) 
(defendant's involvement in murder of witness precluded assertion of confrontation 
rights); State v. Olson, 291 N.W.2d 203, 207 (Minn. 1980) (waiver where witness 
feared retribution and therefore did not testify after receiving threats from defen-
dant); United States v. Carlson, 547 F.2d 1346, 1359 (8th Cir. 1976) (defendant's 
procurement of witness's absence from trial by threats constituted waiver of con-
frontation rights), cert. denied, 431 U.S. 914 (1977). Paul Markland argues that 
"the most equitable response to the problem of defendant-procured witness unavail-
ability is the complete abrogation of the defendant's ability to object on confronta-
tion or hearsay grounds to the admission of any of that witness' [sic] out-of-court 
statements, including unsworn, ex parte, and extrajudicial declarations." Markland, 
supra note 48 at 998. See also Kenneth Graham, The Right of Confrontation and 
the Hearsay Rule: Sir Walter Raleigh Loses Another One, 8 CRIM. L. BULL. 99, 139 
(1972) (arguing that a defendant who is found responsible for murdering a witness 
should be prevented from using the confrontation clause to block that witness's 
statements in court). 
13
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Proposed Fed. R. Evid. 804(b)(6). Under the proposed rule, "[a] 
statement offered against a party who has engaged or acqui-
esced in wrongdoing that was intended to, and did, procure the 
unavailability of the declarant as a witness" is not inadmissi-
ble as hearsay.55 The proposed rule potentially reaches quite 
broadly: it is not limited to prior grand jury testimony, so in 
theory any prior statements would be admissible under the 
new rule if the conditions are met. 
Under the Federal Rules of Evidence, a prior grand jury 
statement by a witness made unavailable by the wrongful 
conduct of a party is admissible against that party if that 
statement would have been admissible if the witness had testi-
fied.56 This testimony of a witness unavailable at trial is usu-
ally admitted under the residual exception.57 The rule derives 
both from the public policy of protecting the integrity of the 
adversary process and from the equitable doctrine of "clean 
. hands."58 A controlling principle of hearsay exclusion is the 
preference of the law for live testimony, which is designed to 
protect everyone.59 However, the contravening policy in this 
context argues that a defendant cannot hide behind that pref-
erence after creating the situation that precludes its use.60 
Although not directly parallel, domestic homicides impli-
cate a similar public policy and equitable analysis. The accused 
allegedly killed the only witness to his threats and violence, 
who is also the only witness to the homicide. Thus, it seems 
only fair that the killer not be shielded from the victim's state-
ments after procuring her silence. However, in domestic homi-
cide cases, the trial is itself about whether the accused killed 
the hearsay declarant, so the procurement of witness unavail-
ability question merges with the central issue at trial. This 
conflation of the issues argues for a separate rule for threat 
hearsay, with an independent determination of reliability or 
55. FED. R. EVID. 804(b)(6) (Proposed Rule 1996). According to the Committee 
Notes, the test for determining waiver will be by a preponderance of the evidence. 
FED. R. EVID. 804(b)(6) advisory committee's note (Proposed Rule 1996). 
56. MUELLER & KIRKPATRICK, supra note 9, at § 8.66. 
57. Id. 
58. GRAHAM, supra note 50. 
59. See MUELLER & KIRKPATRICK, supra note 9, at § 8.3. 
60. GRAHAM, supra note 50. 
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waiver.61 
Procurement of witness unavailability cases normally 
concern admissibility of prior testimony under oath, which ' 
presumably carries substantial indicia of reliability, and an 
equitable judgment of waiver by misconduct. While domestic 
homicide threat hearsay does not involve prior testimony,62 
the waiver argument arguably still applies. A victim of domes-
tic violence and threats would generally have as little or less 
incentive to lie than would a witness to a crime, and the court 
can analyze the circumstances of the victim's declaration for 
trustworthiness.63 
If threat hearsay were subject to the same standard as in 
procurement cases, a preliminary determination would have to 
be made as to whether the accused procured the absence of the 
victimlwitness.64 As this determination would probably be on-
ly by a preponderance of the evidence,65 much of this kind of 
hearsay would be admitted. However, such safeguards may not 
be necessary because, unlike in procurement cases, threat and 
abuse hearsay does not directly indict the accused for the 
crime, but rather provides one part of cumulative evidence 
linking the accused to the crime. Nonetheless, such a prelimi-
nary finding may be necessary to ensure that a threat hearsay 
exception survives a constitutional challenge. 
D. ANALOGY TO CHILD HEARSAY STATEMENTS IN SEX ABUSE 
PROSECUTIONS 
A related problem arises when courts consider whether 
and how to admit hearsay from child victims alleging sexual 
abuse. In that context, the child is "unavailable" as a witness 
61. See discussion in Part IIIB, infra. 
62, In a Westlaw search of cases involving a victim's statements concerning 
threats by or fear of the accused, none included any prior testimony by the victim. 
63. Often, witnesses made unavailable by the accused had agreed to provide 
testimony in exchange for leniency. See, e.g., Markland, supra note 48, at 996-97. 
64. Threat hearsay could conceivably fall within Proposed FED. R. EVID. 
B04(b)(6), although some problems arise from the conflation of the issue at trial 
and the preliminary determination that the accused procured the unavailability of 
the witness. 
65, See cases cited supra note 52; FED, R. EVID. B04(b)(6) advisory committee's 
note (Proposed Rule 1996). 
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because of her "tender years"; that is, the child may be emo-
tionally unable to testify in court after disclosing the circum-
stances of abuse to a parent, doctor, counselor, or officer of the 
COurt.66 Yet, because the child victim is the crucial, and fre-
quently only, witness who can link the accused with the 
crime,67 a number of states have enacted statutes or modified 
their evidence rules so that such testimony may be admit-
ted.68 Typically, such statutes admit a child's out-of-court 
hearsay statement if sufficient indicia of reliability are indicat-
ed by the content and circumstances of the declaration.69 
The child abuse hearsay problem differs from threat hear-
say in a domestic homicide in two significant ways. First, the 
child is only functionally unavailable, so the debate often fo-
cuses on the Sixth Amendment confrontation clause - unavail-
ability requirement issues. The confrontation clause gives the 
accused the right "to be confronted with the witnesses against 
him,,,70 so prosecutors must make a good faith effort to pro-
duce available witnesses instead of simply offering their prior 
statements.71 Witnesses can be psychologically unavailable; in 
the child victim context this has resulted in extensive use of 
videotaped and remote testimony and admission of prior state-
ments that fit an existing exception.72 In contrast to the child 
sex abuse victim, the victim of a domestic homicide is invari-
ably dead, and thus clearly unavailable, so the dispute focuses 
more explicitly on whether the victim's statements fit into an 
existing hearsay exception and on their reliability. 
Second, the child witness's testimony, if admitted, directly 
implicates the accused and often constitutes the only direct 
evidence for the prosecution.73 Such testimony raises signifi-
66. Judy Yun, Note, A Comprehensive Approach to Child Hearsay Statements 
in Sex Abuse Cases, 83 COLUM. L. REv. 1745, 1746 (1983). 
67. See Henry Weinstein, Child Sex Abuse Cases Pose Dilemma for Prosecu-
tions, L.A. TIMES, Sept. 19, 1993, at AI; John E. B. Myers et aI., Expert Testimo-
ny in Child Sexual Abuse Litigation, 68 NEB. L. REV. I, 34 n.120 (1989). 
68. Weinstein, supra note 67; Myers et aI., supra note 67. See also Yun, supra 
note 66. 
69. See Yun, supra note 66, at 1746 & n.15, citing 1982 WASH. LEGIS. SERVo 
ch. 129, § 2 (West). 
70. U.S. CONST. amend. XI. 
71. Ohio v. Roberts, 448 U.S. 56 (1980). 
72. See MUELLER & KIRKPATRICK supra note 9 at § 8.8l. 
73. Many child sexual abuse cases lack physical evidence. Much abuse does 
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cant confrontation clause issues because of its centrality to the 
prosecution's case.74 In contrast, while future threat hearsay 
may provide a crucial link in the prosecution's case against the 
accused, it does not assert that "he killed me" but rather that 
"he threatened to kill me" or "[at the time of this statement] I 
believe he is going to kill me." Such hearsay would not in it-
self, if believed, be sufficient evidence for a homicide convic-
tion. Unlike in child sex abuse cases, this indirect evidence 
serves more to explicate the nature of the violence in the rela-
tionship, to educate the factfinder, and to provide incremental 
evidence of motive or identity. 
Nonetheless, existing and proposed child hearsay statutes 
and rules could serve as a partial model for a threat hearsay 
exception given the relative similarity of issues. In a typical 
example, the Washington model child sex abuse hearsay stat-
ute provides in part: 
(A) A statement made by a child, under the 
protected age in the statute for which the defen-
dant is being charged, describing any act of 
sexual contact on or with the child, is admissible 
in evidence in a criminal proceeding if: 
(1) The court finds, in a hearing conducted out-
side the presence of the jury, that the time, 
content, and circumstances of the statement 
provide particularized guarantees of trustworthi-
ness; 
(2) The statement was made immediately after 
the offense or the court finds the delay consis-
tent with truth; 
(3) The statement was not made in preparation 
not involve penetration or other physically discernible evidence, the abuse almost 
always occurs in secret, and the child does not immediately disclose what hap-
pened because of intimidation. See, e.g., Weinstein, supra note 67; Robert G. 
Marks, Note, Should We Believe The People Who Believe The Children?: The Need 
for A New Sexual Abuse Tender Years Hearsay Exception Statute, 32 HARv. J. ON 
LEGIS. 207 (1995). 
74. Under one theory explaining the operation of the confrontation clause, 
hearsay is constitutionally admissible if it pertains to a peripheral issue or if it 
involves circumstantial or corroborative evidence, but not if it is "direct and criti-
cal evidence going to the heart of the prosecutor's case," which is consistent with 
the underlying principles of why the constitution gives this protection to a crimi-
nal accused. MUELLER & KIRKPATRICK supra note 9, at § 8.75, citing Dutton v. 
Evans, 400 U.S. 74 (1970). 
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of a legal proceeding; .... 75 
These standards for determining trustworthiness may be 
transferable to the domestic homicide-threat hearsay context. 
In both child sex abuse and domestic homicide cases, the 
victim has unique information about the accused, evidence that 
may be essential to a conviction. Just as for child sex abuse 
victims, courts should accord special treatment to statements 
by victims of domestic homicide. In both cases, the victims can 
provide vital, unique testimony unavailable from any other 
source. The constitutional rights of the accused can still be 
protected, if "the circumstances of the statement provide par-
ticularized guarantees of trustworthiness"76 in the narrow 
context of domestic homicide or child sexual abuse. 
II. THE RULES OF EVIDENCE AND FUTURE THREAT 
HEARSAY 
Published opinions constitute the basis for analysis of how 
courts rule on evidentiary questions.77 Yet, written opinions 
reveal only a fraction of all evidence rulings, and thus of hear-
say rulings. 78 Because state courts try most criminal cases 
75. WASH. REV. CODE § 9A.44.120 (1991), quoted in Marks, supra note 73, at 
213 n.25 (1995). 
76. Ohio v. Roberts, 448 U.S. 56, 57 (1980). 
77. The O.J. Simpson trial was unique in that each evidence ruling was imme-
diately available electronically, closely scrutinized by the press and legal pundits, 
and hotly debated on prime time and during coffee breaks. 
78. See generally, Eleanor Swift, The Hearsay Rule at Work: Has It Been Abol-
ished De Facto by Judicial Decision?, 76 MINN. L. REV. 473 (1992). In discussing 
the statistical basis for her analysis of the judicial treatment of hearsay and her 
predictions of the consequences of liberalization or abolition of the hearsay rule, 
Swift points out that, 
[e]xtensive data about the behavior of trial judges 
toward hearsay is not available. There simply is no 
record of most day-to-day rulings on evidence ques-
tions. Those rulings that are recorded in pre-trial 
orders and in trial transcripts are not easily acces-
sible. Hotly contested evidence rulings can be ques-
tioned on appeal, but many rulings are not contest-
ed and many cases are not appealed . . . The inac-
cessibility of trial court actions regarding hearsay is 
a frustrating fact of life." Id. at 474. 
18
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and state trial court opinions are not published, the only evi-
dentiary rulings we see are those challenged on appeal. A 
further narrowing results from the fact that in criminal cases 
only the defendant may appeal evidentiary rulings-with cer-
tain narrow exceptions the prosecution cannot appeal adverse 
rulings or the final decision in a case-so only the rulings 
adverse to the defendant are appealed.79 Nonetheless, judicial 
opinions indicate which hearsay issues are disputed, how 
courts treat the issues presented, and how trial judges will 
tend to rule in the future. In a limited survey of general hear-
say rulings, one commentator found that courts exclude a sub-
stantial amount of hearsay at the trial level, so it never reach-
es public view.80 She also found that appeals courts usually 
affirm the evidentiary rulings of the lower courts, giving great 
deference to the trial court rulings on review.81 In contrast, 
my review of hearsay rulings in domestic homicide cases indi-
cates that appellate courts quite frequently find admission of 
threat hearsay erroneous (although usually harmless error).82 
But, without making a direct statistical comparison between 
hearsay rulings in domestic homicide and other cases, it is 
impossible to tell whether the statistical pattern in fact differs 
in the domestic homicide context. 
In a search for rulings excluding or admitting future 
threat hearsay, I found that the overwhelming majority of the 
cases involved killings of an estranged or former partner, re-
ferred to here as "domestic homicide."83 In the domestic homi-
79. See, e.g., FED. R. APP. FRoc. 4(b). 
80. Swift, supra note 78, at 474. 
81. In Eleanor Swift's opinion, based on her extensive survey of hearsay rul-
ings, "whether federal district courts admit or exclude the hearsay, appellate 
courts usually uphold the district courts' decision on appeal." Swift, supra note 78, 
at 478. 
82. See cases cited in Part IIe-G, infra. 
83. I conducted this search on Westlaw, for both state and federal decisions, 
and verified it as of April 1996. This search revealed 93 cases challenging admis-
sion of threat and abuse or fear hearsay by a homicide victim. Out of these cases, 
ten victims were men killed by another man in non-domestic homicides. One vic-
tim was the boyfriend of the defendant's ex-wife. Three victims were women killed 
in the home by male relatives. In three cases, the victim/declarant was a man 
expressing fear of and threats by his spouse. All the remaining cases involved 
statements by women who were apparently victims of domestic homicide. 
In reviewing these cases, the extraordinary similarity of fact patterns is 
almost overwhelming. With minor variations, the same pattern recurs of domestic 
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cide context courts admit certain threat hearsay under the 
existing exceptions to the hearsay rule, which are modeled 
after those in Federal Rules of Evidence. However, admission 
of such hearsay varies substantially from state to state, and 
among courts within a state. Even in the states with the most 
expansive interpretations of the hearsay rules, certain kinds of 
threats are excluded altogether, admitted subject to limiting 
instructions, or admitted but then held erroneous on appeal. 
Among these cases, courts most often admit threat hearsay 
under rules similar to Fed. R. Evid. 803(3), which provides 
that such evidence may be admitted if the victim's state of 
mind is at issue, but only for a limited purpose.84 The other 
exceptions that have been held to apply include the excited 
utterance, present sense impression, medical diagnosis, and 
residual or "catchall" exceptions. 
A. HEARSAY UNDER THE EXISTING RULES OF EVIDENCE 
Under the hearsay rule, out-of-court statements "offered in 
evidence to prove the matter asserted" are inadmissible in 
court unless the original declarant testifies or the declaration 
fits into one of the categorical exceptions to the rule.85 The 
hearsay doctrine arises from the belief that out-of-court state-
ments are intrinsically inferior proof.86 This perception is usu-
ally explained in terms of the risks involved with admitting 
hearsay-of misperception, faulty memory, insincerity, and 
narrative ambiguity-and the preference for cross-examination 
at trial.87 
Numerous exceptions have long coexisted with the hearsay 
violence, victim's declarations to friends or professionals regarding fear and 
threats, victim's decision to leave the relationship, culminating in a brutal murder. 
Then, despite substantial other evidence indicative of guilt, the defendant appeals 
admission of even a fraction of the threat hearsay. 
84. Standard bases for finding the victim's state of mind at issue include 
defendant's claim of accident, self-defense, lack of motive, or, sometimes, simply 
that the relationship was peaceful and loving. This evidence is admitted for the 
limited purpose of considering the victim's state of mind, but not for the truth of 
the matter remembered or believed. FED. R. EVID. 803(3). See Part lIE, infra, for 
a discussion of domestic homicide cases applying this exception. 
85. See MUELLER & KIRKPATRICK, supra note 9, at § 8.l. 
86. [d. at § 8.2. 
87. [d. 
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rule. Courts have developed these categorical exceptions be-
cause of the perception that certain statements are inherently 
reliable despite the absence of direct testimony and because 
the need for certain evidence outweighs the risks.88 The ne-
cessity for threat evidence is critical in the domestic homicide 
context. With the declarant dead-likely at the hands of the 
accused-when her statements have a unique evidentiary val-
ue, the necessity for that evidence justifies admission despite 
the basic hearsay exclusionary rule and the reliability risks. 
The categorical hearsay exceptions are not derived from ab-
stract analysis but rather have developed on a more pragmatic, 
ad hoc basis; their purpose is "merely to sanction certain situa-
tions as a sufficient guarantee of trustworthiness," not to per-
manently define those situations that justify a specific excep-
tion.89 
B. ADMISSIBILITY OF STATEMENTS BY VICTIM CONCERNING 
THREATS BY THE ACCUSED 
Courts admit future threat hearsay evidence under some 
of the existing exceptions, including those based on Rules 
803(1H4) and Rule 804(b)(5). The majority of such threats are 
admitted under Rule 803(3), the "state of mind," and Rule 
804(b)(5), the residual "catchall," exceptions.90 However, the 
rules are applied inconsistently from state to state.91 While a 
few courts have crafted interpretations that regularly admit 
threat hearsay in domestic homicide cases under the state-of-
mind exception,92 this "gloss" on the rules of evidence is not 
authorized by the plain language of any hearsay exception, and 
such admissions are generally for a limited purpose. 
As is discussed in Parts IIC-G below, many other courts 
have applied an unduly restrictive interpretation and reversed 
convictions for impermissible admission of hearsay despite 
seemingly overwhelming evidence of the defendant's guilt. And, 
throughout the cases, many statements by victims concerning 
88. See FED. R. EVID. 803 & 804 advisory committee's note. 
89. 5 WIGMORE, EVIDENCE IN TRIALS AT COMMON LAw (J. Chadbourne, 1974). 
90. See discussion in Part IID-E, infra. 
91. Id. 
92. See cases cited Part IIE1, infra. 
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threats by and fear of the accused are barred as inadmissible 
hearsay or subject to limiting instructions, or found inadmissi-
ble but harmless on appea1.93 
C. TREATMENT OF THREAT EVIDENCE AS A PRESENT SENSE IM-
PRESSION - FED. R. EVID. 803(1) 
Admission of threat hearsay under the present sense im-
pression exception is unusual because the victim rarely de-
scribes the threat event while it is occurring, or "immediately 
thereafter," as is required by Rule 803(1). To meet this excep-
tion, a statement must describe or explain an event or condi-
tion made "while the declarant was perceiving the event or 
condition, or immediately thereafter.,,94 That is, the proponent 
must show that the event, the declarant's perception of the 
event, and the declarant's statement were contemporaneous, 
and the statement must pertain to the declarant's observation 
of the event. Because she is almost always alone with her 
abuser when the threat is made, the victim is almost never 
able to describe the threat contemporaneously. 
Commonwealth v. Coleman95 was the only domestic homi-
cide case found in which the present sense impression excep-
tion was used to admit threat and abuse hearsay. The threat 
evidence was necessary to controvert Coleman's claim that the 
victim "had precipitated his action by an unprovoked attack 
upon him with a letter opener" and thus that the killing was 
voluntary manslaughter, not second-degree murder.96 The 
court held that testimony by the victim's mother that "Diane 
telephoned . . . saying that Coleman would not let her leave 
the apartment, that he would hang up the phone and that he 
was going to kill her" was admissible "under a variant of the 
res gestae exception to the hearsay rule" (present sense im-
pression).97 In the majority's opinion, this was warranted by 
the immediacy and ongoing character of the events, because 
ten minutes later the phone connection was broken at the 
93. See Parts IIC-E, infra. 
94. FED. R. EVID. 803(1). 
95. 326 A.2d 387 (Pa. 1974). 
96. [d. at 388. 
97. [d. at 389. 
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victim's end, and because only twenty minutes later police 
found Diane in the apartment, dead of multiple stab 
wounds.98 In contrast, the concurrence argued that the major-
ity opinion was an impermissible extension of the present 
sense impression exception and that the evidence should in-
stead have been admitted as an excited utterance.99 
Utility of the present sense impression rule is obviously 
limited in the domestic homicide-threat hearsay context. The 
contemporaneity requirements are unlikely to be met in most 
domestic violence cases because almost invariably the abuser 
threatens in private and isolates the victim from others; most 
commonly, the victim discloses the threat after the fact, pre-
cluding use of this exception. In addition, statements admissi-
ble under this rule are limited to a description of an event or 
condition, which would generally not encompass statements of 
belief or cumulative fear by the victim. 
D. TREATMENT OF THREAT EVIDENCE AS AN EXCITED 
UTTERANCE - FED. R. EVID. 803(2) 
Under Rule 803(2), the excited utterance exception, a 
"statement relating to a startling event or condition made 
while the declarant was under the stress of excitement caused 
by the event or condition" is admissible. Although certain 
statements regarding threats by and victims' fear of the ac-
cused are admitted under this exception, the time and emo-
tional stress limitations reduces the utility of this exception in 
the threat hearsay context. In general, courts hold that the 
time between the stressful event and the declaration must be 
quite short, and that the declarant still be under significant 
stress of the recent event when she makes the statement. 100 
Since such threats and abuse profoundly intimidate and often 
virtually imprison the victim, only rarely does she immediately 
escape the abuser and disclose her terror. WI 
98. [d. 
99. [d. at 391 (Pomeroy, J. concurring). 
100. MUELLER & KIRKPATRICK, supra note 9, at § 8.35. 
101. See, e.g., JONES, supra note 13; WALKER, THE BATTERED WOMAN, supra 
note 5, at 185-250. 
23
Matthews: Proposed Threat Hearsay Exception
Published by GGU Law Digital Commons, 1997
140 GOLDEN GATE UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 27:117 
In a fairly straightforward ruling, the court in State v. 
Woodward admitted as an excited utterance the victim's state-
ment to neighbors that her husband planned to kill her.l02 
Minutes after her estranged husband arrived at her house, 
fought with her father, and took her children, the victim ran 
over to her neighbors' house and made the statement while 
curled up on the couch in fetal position and sobbing. l03 How-
ever, other similar threats disclosed by the victim were not ad-
missible because they did not fit any of the hearsay exceptions, 
despite the consistent pattern of threats and abuse in the rela-
tionship.l04 Similarly, in State v. Anderson, the victim's state-
ment, made 30 minutes after incident, that her husband had 
threatened to kill her was admissible as an excited utter-
ance. 105 
However, in Commonwealth v. Myers/06 testimony by the 
victim's neighbor that a few months before her murder "she 
was terribly beat up, her face and eye were all terribly bruised, 
and her tooth was chipped, and she told me that her husband 
beat her up" and that she was fearful and crying the whole 
weekend, was inadmissible. l07 This evidence was not admissi-
ble under either the excited utterance or state of mind excep-
tions, although the victim was killed by multiple stab wounds 
shortly thereafter, and the accused claimed that she had at-
tacked him and he had acted in self-defense/os which would 
normally place the victim's state of mind at issue. 
Anderson and Myers demonstrate the inconsistent manner 
in which courts apply the excited utterance exception in do-
102. 908 P.2d 231, 233 (N.M. 1995). 
103. Id. at 234. 
104. Id. at 239. The victim's statements about her fear of the accused were 
admissible as made to a physician in course of treatment. Her statement to her 
counselor that "David [the accused] is going to kill me" was not covered by hear-
say exception because it was a "statement of memory or belief," although the court 
found it to be harmless error. Id. 
105. 723 P.2d 464, 468 (Wash. App. 1986). The victim's subsequent description 
of the same incident in a family counseling session was admissible as an adoptive 
admission, because Anderson nodded when the counselor asked if her description 
was true. Id. 
106. 609 A.2d 162 (Pa. 1992). 
107. Id. at 165 (reversable error). 
108. Id. at 162. Investigators determined that the few superficial stab wounds 
he had sustained were self-inflicted. Id. 
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mestic homicide cases. Further, many victims of domestic vio-
lence do not communicate their fear and tell of the threats 
against them during a highly emotional state; right after the 
attack, they are just trying to survive and forestall further 
injury.109 Often, victims of domestic violence are so isolated 
that they cannot tell anyone about the violence; it is only later, 
when they escape the control of the abuser and the immediate 
danger, that they can talk about it.110 By then, the excited 
utterance exception no longer applies, even though the victim 
arguably has greater perspective on the events and less motive 
to fabricate. This exception fails to address the long-term pat-
tern of intimidation in an abusive relationship and how diffi-
cult it often is for victims to reveal their situation to others, so 
it does not reach the majority of such disclosures. 
E. TREATMENT OF THREAT EVIDENCE UNDER THE STATE OF 
MIND EXCEPTION - FED. R. EVID. 803(3) 
Under Rule 803(3) "[a] statement of the declarant's then 
existing state of mind, emotion, sensation, or physical condi-
tion (such as intent, plan, motive, design, mental feeling, pain, 
and bodily health)" may be admitted. III This exception also 
admits certain statements to prove the declarant's subsequent 
conduct,112 but this broader use rarely applies in threat hear-
say cases. Although it is the most commonly used to admit 
threat hearsay, this exception contains three crucial limita-
tions for the domestic homicide context: (1) the victim's state of 
mind must be at issue;1l3 (2) this exception excludes "a state-
ment of memory or belief to prove the fact remembered or 
believed" so backward-looking statements about threats are 
not admissible as substantive evidence;114 and (3) even if ad-
mitted, the statement is subject to limiting instructions to the 
jury.ll5 
109. See Part IB, supra. 
110. See, e.g., HOFELLER, supra note 20, at 94-95. 
111. FED. R. EVID. 803(3). 
112. MUELLER & KIRKPATRICK, supra note 9, at § 8.36. 
113. See Part IIE1, infra. 
114. See Part IIE2, infra. 
115. See Part I1E3, infra. 
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1. Admissible if Victim's State of Mind at Issue 
When the victim's state of mind is "at issue" most courts 
admit expressions of fear-and sometimes threats if inter-
twined with the expression of fear-by a victim/declarant un-
der Rule 803(3). However, the "at issue" limitation precludes 
admission of many statements from domestic homicide victims, 
when a court construes "at issue" narrowly or when, as in the 
Simpson case, the accused simply claims he was not the perpe-
trator. Courts generally find the victim's state of mind to be at 
issue where the defendant claims that the death was acciden-
tal or provoked, or when he claims that the relationship was 
peaceful and happy; evidence of abuse, fear, and threats may 
then be admitted in rebuttal. 116 
The Washington Supreme Court applied a typical analysis 
in State v. Parr,117 saying: 
. .. if there is no defense which brings into 
issue the state of mind of the deceased, evidence 
of fears or other emotions is ordinarily not rele-
vant. But where a defense such as that of acci-
dent or self-defense is interposed. .. , courts 
have generally allowed the admission of evi-
dence of the victim's fears, as probative of the 
question whether that person would have been 
likely to do the acts claimed by the defen-
dant.us 
However, while the court in Parr found the victim's state-
ments of fear admissible under the state of mind exception, 
116. See, e.g., State v. Porter, 587 A.2d 188 (Del. Supr. 1990) (statement by 
victim about death threats admissible in homicide prosecution if meet standard 
requirements of then-existing state of mind exception and if admitted in rebuttal 
to evidence of accident, self-defense, suicide, or extreme emotional distress); State 
v. Finch, 29 Cal. Rptr. 420 (Cal. App. 1963) (victim's statements of fear of her 
husband and threats made by him, admissible under state of mind exception 
where he claimed that he was attempting to disarm her); State v. Atchley, 346 
P.2d 764 (Cal. 1959), cert. dismissed 366 U.S. 207 (1961) (letter that victim wrote 
to a judge two days before her death, saying her husband had threatened her and 
she feared him, where defendant claimed she had threatened him, admissible un-
der state of mind exception). 
117. 606 P.2d 263 (Wash. 1980). 
118. Id. at 269. 
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related statements by the victim about threats and other abu-
sive conduct by the accused were not, even though they were 
arguably probative of intent. 119 
Courts regularly admit statements of fear to rebut claims 
of accident.120 For example, in State v. Crawford, the victim's 
statement of fear was admissible, even though it included a 
statement of her belief about her husband's intent, to show the 
nature of their relationship and the effect of his behavior on 
her state of mind. 121 This testimony included statements by 
the victim saying that she feared the defendant, that he had 
threatened to kill her, that he had physically abused her, and 
that he had been stalking her.122 Although admissible, the 
statements were subject to standard limiting instructions, 
which told the jury to consider it only with respect to the 
victim's state of mind, not as evidence of the facts asserted. 123 
The question of consent also places the victim's state of 
mind at issue. In People v. Ortiz, t~e victim's statements that 
she was afraid of the accused, and that he had attempted to 
rape her and had repeatedly "bothered" her were admissible 
under the state-of-mind exception.124 The victim's state of 
mind was at issue because the accused claimed that he and the 
victim had engaged in consensual intercourse the morning she 
was killed. 125 Similarly, in State v. Faucette, the victim's 
statements to her son and her sister regarding threats and 
other comments made by her estranged husband were admissi-
ble under the state of mind exception to show that she did not 
want the accused to visit her home, and to prove that he en-
119. [d. 
120. State v. Crawford, 472 S.E.2d 920 (N.C. 1996). See also State v. Magruder, 
765 P.2d 716 (Mont. Supr. 1988) (testimony of the victim's daughter about a tele-
phone call from the accused to victim a few hours before her death and the 
victim's emotions afterward admissible under state of mind exception where defen-
dant claimed accident). But see Hunt v. State, 429 So.2d 811 (Fla. App. 1983) 
(testimony about victim's fear of defendant inadmissible, where defendant claimed 
the victim had been accidentally shot). 
121. Crawford, 472 S.E.2d at 927. 
122. [d. at 926. 
123. [d. 
124. 44 Cal. Rptr. 2d 914, 925 (Cal. App. 1995). 
125. [d. 
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tered without consent. 126 
Some courts interpret the state-of-mind exception more 
expansively. For example, the court in Brenk v. State allowed a 
friend of the victim "to testify that Lou Alice Brenk was crying 
and when he asked her 'Lou, what's the matter, Honey?' she 
had said to him '[hJe's going to kill me, Dink.,"127 The defen-
dant claimed neither accident nor self-defense, and did not 
claim that the relationship was happy or peacefuL 12S Thus, 
the victim's state of mind was not at issue under traditional 
analysis. Yet, with virtually no explanation as to why the 
victim's state of mind was at issue, the trial court allowed this 
statement to show Lou Alice's fear, and the state Supreme 
Court did not find an abuse of discretion. 129 
The Delaware Superior Court seemed to stretch the state-
of-mind exception in Re v. State. 130 There the court found ad-
missible the victim's statement that the accused had threat-
ened to kill her and then said "that he would just act like he 
was crazy and get off." 131 The court asserted that this was 
not offered to prove that the accused would kill her, or that he 
would fake insanity, but rather to rebut Re's claim that he 
killed the victim due to extreme emotional distress. 132 That 
is, the victim's expression of fear contradicted the accused's 
argument that she incited stress in him, leading him to kill 
her. 133 
In a more expansive approach, the Oklahoma court in 
Duvall v. State did not require a specific claim by the accused 
to place the victim's state of mind-and thus the threats and 
her fear-at issue. 134 There, the victim's statements that she 
was afraid of her husband because he "told her if she left him 
126. 392 S.E.2d 71 (N.C. 1990). 
127. 847 S.W.2d 1 (Ark. 1993). Although the court calls this exception "present 
sense impression" it in fact quotes a rule worded exactly like 803(3), the state-of-
mind exception. [d. at 12. 
128. [d. at 12-13. 
129. [d. 
130. 540 A.2d 423 (Del. Supr. 1988). 
131. [d. at 430. 
132. [d. 
133. [d. 
134. 825 P.2d 621 (Ok. Crim. App. 1991). 
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that he would kill her" were admissible under the state-of-
mind exception as relevant to show the victim's fear of the 
accused. l35 In Oklahoma courts, hearsay testimony showing 
ill feeling, threats or similar conduct by one spouse toward 
another are generally considered relevant in "marital homi-
cide" cases. 136 Nonetheless, as always for the state-of-mind 
exception, the jury was given limiting instructions on how to 
consider the victim's statements in its deliberations. 137 
Using a similar exception, the military court in U.S. v. 
Elmore admitted threat hearsay to rebut the accused's claim of 
relatively harmonious marriage. 138 While no body had been 
found, other forensic evidence strongly indicated that the 
defendant's wife had been stabbed to death and then dumped 
in the sea.139 There was also substantial hearsay evidence of 
prior domestic violence, jealousy, and threats by the defen-
dant.14O In that case, the court found sufficient circumstantial 
evidence combined with the threat hearsay to support a convic-
tion.141 
In contrast, Georgia and a number of other states do not 
find threat and fear hearsay relevant as such in a domestic 
homicide. In Dover v. State, the Georgia court held the victim's 
conduct was not at issue in a domestic homicide case. 142 
Thus, the victim's statements to several people that she moved 
out of the house and met with a divorce attorney because of 
her husband's violence and threats were not admissible, al-
though other evidence indicated a history of abuse. l43 
135. [d. at 626. 
136. [d. (citing a line of Oklahoma cases asserting relevance in this context). 
This special category for marital homicide is promising. See discussion in Part IV, 
infra. 
137. [d. at 626. In fact, in this case the court gave severe instructions, telling 
the jury that "[a]t this point, you are instructed to disregard all statements of the 
decedent, as they are not relevant to any of the issues you will be called upon to 
decide." [d. 
138. 33 M.J. 387, 398 (C.M.A. 1991). 
139. [d. at 391. 
140. [d. at 388-89. 
141. [d. at 394. 
142. 296 S.E.2d 710, 713 (Ga. 1982). 
143. [d. 
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Taking a different approach, other courts bifurcate the 
question of admissibility of threat evidence, finding a domestic 
homicide exception for the relevance determination but then 
applying standard hearsay analysis to the statement itself.l44 
For example, the Texas court of appeals finds "prior threats 
and altercations between the victim and the accused . . . ad-
missible to show relevant facts and circumstances surrounding 
the killing and to show the relationship existing between the 
two parties" in a domestic homicide or manslaughter prosecu-
tion. l45 However, this exception "does not extend the rules of 
evidence to admit hearsay testimony that would otherwise 
inadmissible."l46 Thus, while allowing a greater scope for the 
relevance determination, these courts do not admit threat 
hearsay unless it fits an existing hearsay exception under the 
traditional analysis. 
2. Not Admissible as Statement of Memory or Belief 
An additional problem in using the state-of-mind exception 
to admit threat hearsay involves the explicit preclusion under 
Rule 803(3) of "a statement of memory or belief to prove the 
fact remembered or believed."147 Because of this limitation, 
courts often exclude the victim's statements as impermissible 
statements of memory or belief, and, if admitted, they are 
144. Other courts explicitly state that evidence concerning the marital relation-
ship may be relevant and admissible for specific purposes in the domestic homicide 
context. See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Ulatoski, 371 A.2d 186, 190-91 (1977) (cita-
tions omitted). ("admissible to prove ill will, motive, or malice, and that such evi-
dence can include instances in which the defendant threatened, quarrelled with, or 
physically abused the victim . . . [but] like any other evidence, it is subject to the 
general evidentiary rules governing competency and relevancy"); State v. Hulsing, 
825 P.2d 1027 (Colo. App. 1991) (in homicide cases involving marital partners, 
circumstances showing discord, jealousy, prior assaults, threats in the relationship 
are relevant to show motive and malice under Fed. R. Evid. 404(b), but even 
though relevant, victim's statements must also be admissible under a hearsay 
exception). 
145. Thomas v. State, 886 S.W.2d 388, 392 (Tex. App. 1994), citing TEx. PENAL 
CODE ANN. § 19.06. 
146. [d. (citations omitted). See also State v. Hulsing, 825 P.2d 1027 (Colo. App. 
1991) (in homicide cases involving marital partners, circumstances showing discord, 
jealousy, prior assaults, threats in the relationship are relvant to show motive and 
malice under Fed. R. Evid. 404(b), but even though relevant, the victim's state-
ments must also be admissible under a hearsay exception). 
147. FED. R. EVID. 803(3). 
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subject to limiting instructions. 
As the court put it in State v. Woodward: l48 
In this case, [Dr.] Chaffee testified that Debbie 
stated that David was going to kill her. He testi-
fied that she was calm when she said it, so it 
was not an excited utterance. Likewise, this was 
not a present sense impression or a statement of 
then-existing mental, emotional, or physical 
condition. It was a 'statement of memory or 
belief and, as such, was inadmissible. 149 
147 
Although the appellate court found admission of this statement 
"harmless beyond a reasonable doubt,"150 the guidance to low-
er courts clearly precludes them from admitting similar testi-
mony in the future. 
The Tenth Circuit in United States v. Joe 151 made a simi-
lar ruling under almost identical circumstances. Ruling on the 
admissibility of the victim's statements to her doctor regarding 
rape and threats by her estranged husband, the court said: 
With respect to the threat statement, Rule 
803(3) therefore would extend to Ms. Joe's state-
ment that she was 'afraid sometimes.' We dis-
agree with the district court's ruling, however, 
because Ms. Joe's statement to Dr. Smoker, 
though indicating her state of mind, also includ-
ed an assertion of why she was afraid (i.e., be-
cause she thought her husband might kill her). 
This portion of Ms. Joe's statement is clearly a 
'statement of memory or belief expressly exclud-
ed by the Rule 803(3) exception. 152 
Similarly, a Texas court held in Navarro v. State that the 
victim's statements to her mother were not admissible under 
148. 908 P.2d 231 (N.M. 1995). 
149. [d. at 239. 
150. The court applied this heightened standard of review because Woodward 
had invoked the Sixth Amendment confrontation clause in challenging admission of 
this evidence. [d. 
151. 8 F.3d 1488 (lOth Cir. 1993). This criminal case was in federal court be-
cause it involved a Native American defendant. 
152. [d. at 1492-93. 
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the state of mind exception. 153 In the court's view, the 
victim's statements that the accused had "put a gun to her 
head and threatened to kill her" and that he had said he would 
kill her if she continued to see her parents had no relevance in 
the case except to prove the truth of the matter asserted. 154 
Thus, "the statements were merely statements of memory to 
prove the fact remembered and therefore were not admissible 
under rule 803(3)."155 
The Federal Rules Advisory Committee stated that: 
[t]he exclusion of 'statements of memory or be-
lief to prove the fact remembered or believed' is 
necessary to avoid the virtual destruction of the 
hearsay rule which would otherwise result from 
allowing state of mind, provable by a hearsay 
statement, to serve as the basis for an inference 
of the happening of the event which produced 
the state of mind.156 
Therefore, arguing for a simple broadening of the state of mind 
exception to remove this limitation would subvert the underly-
ing intent of the rule, and such a change might result in "the 
virtual destruction of the hearsay rule.,,157 In contrast, creat-
ing a new rule that admits "statements of memory or belief' in 
the narrow context of domestic homicides would not. 
3. Admission Subject to Limiting Instructions 
Even when admitted under the state-of-mind exception, 
threat hearsay is subject to limiting instructions to the jury. 
The court typically instructs the jury to consider the state-
ments only with respect to the state of mind of the victim, not 
as evidence of the truth of the facts stated. 158 Some courts 
have developed a more restrictive rule in which "a victim's 
extra-judicial declarations of fear of the defendant are admissi-
153. 863 S.W.2d 191, 197 (Tex. App. 1993). 
154. [d. 
155. [d. (citations omitted). 
156. FED. R. EVID. 803(3) advisory committee's note, citing Shepard v. United 
States, 290 U.S. 96 (1933). 
157. [d. 
158. See generally MUELLER & KIRKPATRICK, supra note 9, at §§ 1.14, 1.16. 
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ble under the state of mind exception to the hearsay rule with 
a limiting instruction only if there is a manifest need for such 
evidence, i.e., if it is relevant to a material issue in the 
case."159 In what it characterizes as a standard limiting in-
struction,160 the court in Duvall v. State seems to craft an 
even more restrictive instruction regarding threat hearsay: the 
judge instructed the jury to completely disregard the victim's 
statements after they had previously been admitted. 161 
There is serious doubt about whether juries pay meaning-
ful attention to limiting instructions and whether they even 
begin to make the fine distinctions called for. But, to the ex-
tent that juries do understand and follow limiting instructions, 
the victim's unique evidence concerning the abuser is excluded 
from their determinations. Even where the jury instruction 
does not affect the outcome of the case, limiting use of the 
victim's words implies a disregard of their importance and 
validity. 
F. TREATMENT OF THREAT HEARSAY UNDER THE MEDICAL 
DIAGNOSIS EXCEPTION - FED. R. EVID B03C 4) 
Threat hearsay rarely comes in under the medical diagno-
sis exception. This seems logical because such statements, to 
be admissible, must be "reasonably pertinent to diagnosis or 
treatment. "162 Since fear may be relevant to depression or 
stress-related illness, courts admit a victim's statements that 
159. State v. Washington, 726 P.2d 43 (Wash. App. 1986) (emphasis added). 
160. This instruction is much more severe than a typical limiting instruction, 
indicating that perhaps the judge changed his mind after admitting the hearsay. 
See State v. Crawford, 472 S.E.2d at 926, and State v. Solo7.ano, 726 P.2d at 52, 
for more standard instructions in the threat hearsay context. 
161. 825 P.2d 621, 626 (Ok. Crim. App. 1991). The court said: 
You were instructed during the trial that you could con· 
sider the statements only as they might relate to the 
decedent's state of mind. At this point, you are instructed 
to disregard all statements of the decedent, as they are 
not relevant to any of the issues you will be called upon 
to decide. [d. 
There was substantial corroboration of the threats and abuse, and the dispute 
pertained to whether the homicide was premeditated or a result of "heat of pas-
sion," so the conviction was not affected by the instruction. [d. 
162. FED. R. EVID. 803(4). 
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she was afraid of the accused. However, threats are usually 
excluded as not pertinent. My search found only two domestic 
homicide cases in which courts admitted such hearsay under 
this exception. 
In State v. Woodward, the court admitted various state-
ments by the victim about threats by and her fear of the ac-
cused.163. The victim's statements that she had been abused 
by her husband and she was deathly afraid of him were admis-
sible as made to physician in course of treatment, as necessary 
information in treating the victim's situational depression. 164 
However, her statement that she was afraid because "David is 
going to kill me" was inadmissible, although harmless error, 
because it was not pertinent to the diagnosis. 165 
In contrast, in State v. Moen, the Oregon Supreme Court 
held admissible a victim's complete statement to her physician 
describing abusive conduct by the accused and her fear that he 
might kill her.166 In this case, the statement was considered 
pertinent information explaining the victim's severe nervous-
ness and depression. 167 Here the victim was the mother-in-
law of the accused, not his wife, but the circumstances were 
similar to those in domestic homicides, in that the violence 
followed the typical pattern. 
G. TREATMENT OF THREAT EVIDENCE UNDER THE CATCHALL 
EXCEPI'ION - FED. R. EVID. 804(B)(5) 
The residual, or catchall, exception provides that a state-
ment having 
equivalent circumstantial guarantees of trust-
worthiness [is admissible], if the court deter-
mines that (A) the statement is offered as evi-
dence of a material fact; (B) the statement is 
more probative on the point for which it is of-
fered than any other evidence proponent can 
163. 908 P.2d 231, 239 (N.M. 1995). 
164. [d. 
165. [d. 
166. 786 P.2d 111, 119-20 (Or. 1990). 
167. [d. at 120. 
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procure through reasonable efforts; and (C) the 
general purposes of these rules and the interests 
of justice will best be served by admission ... 168 
151 
A number of courts have admitted threat hearsay in domestic 
homicides under the catchall exception; certain exemplars are 
discussed infra. 
The North Carolina Supreme Court recently took a prom-
ising approach in State v. Baker, in which it admitted the 
victim's statements under what it called the "exception for 
unavailable declarant," which was the state equivalent of the 
catchall. ls9 The court focused on the victim's personal knowl-
edge of underlying events, her motivation to speak the truth to 
the witness, whether she ever recanted her statement, the 
nature and character of statement, and the relationship be-
tween the parties. 170 Here, the court found that the declarant 
was likely to be honest in statements made to a close friend, 
and that the victim's statement to the police regarding ill will 
between the accused and the victim, the victim's fear of him, 
and his prior attacks on the victim were likely to possess req-
uisite guarantees of trustworthiness. 171 
In a similar vein, the Georgia court in Hawkins v. 
State l72 admitted the victim's statements under the catchall 
exception, finding sufficient reliability and relevance~ Three 
days before she was killed by four shotgun blasts at close 
range, the victim made a report to the police in which she said 
that her husband had threatened to shoot her.173 The court 
held that this statement was relevant to show the accused's 
intent and course of conduct.174 In affirming the decision of 
the trial court, the supreme court emphasized "that the evi-
dence was excepted from the hearsay rule by necessity, the 
declarant being unavailable because of her death ... and the 
168. FED. R. EVID. 804(b)(5). 
169. 451 S.E.2d 574, 592 (N.C. 1994) (citing the state equivalent of FED. R. 
EVID. 804(b)(5». 
170. Id. 
171. Id. at 593. 
172. 448 S.E.2d 214 (Ga. 1994). 
173. Id. at 215. 
174. [d. 
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statement being replete with indicia of reliability."175 
Similarly, in State v. Faucette the court found statements 
made by the victim to her attorney admissible under the catch-
all exception.176 The court admitted the evidence with reason-
ing similar to that used in the state-of-mind cases; it was con-
sidered relevant to rebut the contention that the accused went 
to the victim's home to talk with the victim and see his son, 
not with intent to murder her. 177 In the catchall exception 
analysis, the court found these statements to be the most pro-
bative evidence available regarding domestic problems between 
the accused and victim.178 Further, the attorney-client rela-
tionship provided a sufficient guaranty of trustworthiness. 179 
In contrast, the Iowa court in State v. Williams l80 held 
inadmissible testimony that was arguably more reliable and 
probative than the cases cited supra. In Williams, the victim's 
domestic relations attorney testified about a conversation on 
the morning of the murder in which the victim told him that 
"the defendant, on the previous day, had threatened to throw 
her through a plate glass window and use the broken glass to 
cut her head Off."lBl In the court's view, "[t]he only discernible 
purpose of this testimony was to establish the threat was 
made. That, of course, depends on the truth of the matters 
asserted by [the victim]."lB2 Despite seemingly overwhelming 
evidence against the accused and despite his claim of "acci-
dent/struggle," the court did not find the threat hearsay admis-
sible under the residual or any other hearsay exception. l83 
The court went further, holding the admission of this evidence 
to be reversible error, despite substantial evidence indicating 
the defendant's guilt, including forensic evidence showing that 
175. [d. (citations omitted). 
176. 392 S.E.2d 71, 75 (N.C. 1990). 
177. [d. 
178. [d. at 76. 
179. [d. 
180. 427 N.W.2d 469 (Iowa 1988). 
181. [d. at 471. 
182. [d. I argue that such testimony should be admitted for the truth of the 
matter asserted. That is why a new hearsay exception is required. 
183. See Part lIE, supra, for discussion of cases in which such evidence was 
admitted under the state-of-mind exception, although subject to limiting instruc-
tions. 
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the victim was shot while lying on the bed rather than while 
standing beside it and the testimony of two witnesses that he 
had threatened to kill the victim only hours before she 
died. l84 
These catchall cases illustrate how much courts vary in 
their treatment of threat hearsay in the domestic homicide 
context. In general, the courts appear to disagree about the 
meaning of the catchall exceptions and fail to use them as 
intended, in part because of the ambiguity of the rules and the 
limitations inherent in the hearsay doctrine. l85 
While the catchall exception would seem flexible enough to 
admit statements made to family, friends, or professionals 
about domestic abuse, threats, and intimidation, it does not 
appear to be generally used in this context. Unlike in the child 
sex abuse and witness procurement contexts, this exception is 
not used extensively to admit threat hearsay and does not 
seem to be undergoing any substantial development in threat 
hearsay-domestic homicide cases. Instead, this judicial modifi-
cation and extension of the hearsay rule seems to be occurring 
primarily within the more restrictive state-of-mind excep-
tion. l86 Nonetheless, a framework for determining constitu-
tional reliability can be derived from the judicially developed 
approaches to admission of threat hearsay under the catchall 
exception. 
H. LIMITS OF THE EXISTING HEARSAY EXCEPTIONS PREVENT 
THE VICTIM'S WORDS FROM BEING HEARD 
It could be said that many courts have contorted and 
stretched the existing hearsay exceptions in order to admit 
threat hearsay in domestic homicide cases. Although we might 
agree with the particular ruling or the result in a case, adapta-
tion or revision of the rules of evidence should not be left to 
the discretion of individual trial judges. Not only does judicial 
184. 427 N.W.2d at 470. 
185. David A. Sonenshein, The Residual Exceptions to the Federal Hearsay Rule: 
Two Exceptions in Search of a Rule, 57 N.Y.U. L. REv. 867 (1982). 
186. See discussion Part lIE, supra. 
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modification of the rules probably exceed their authority, it 
fails to provide sufficient guidance to counsel and other judges. 
And it fails to give notice to abusers that hidden threats will 
not remain hidden if the victim is silenced.187 
A specific hearsay exception, derived in part from the more 
expansive readings of the existing exceptions, would provide 
greater clarity and certainty to litigants and courts; it would 
also explicitly assert a public policy against domestic violence. 
In order to systematically admit this sometimes crucial evi-
dence within the domestic homicide context, the federal and 
state rules of evidence should be revised to include a new ex-
ception. Thus, all the threat hearsay statements of the victim 
would be admissible under one rule, rather than admitted 
under an array of exceptions or precluded in a piecemeal fash-
ion as occurs now. 
III. CRITIQUES OF THE HEARSAY RULES AND 
PROPOSALS FOR REFORM 
Many commentators advocate abolition or substantial 
revision of the existing hearsay rules and exceptions. 188 These 
187. While it is dubious that abusers know or think about hearsay rules, the 
concept of notice is basic to our jurisprudence, and systematic approaches to evi-
dence potentially filter into the general social consciousness. 
188. See, e.g., Edward R. Becker & Aviva Orenstein, The Federal Rules of Evi-
dence after Sixteen Years-The Effect of "Plain Meaning" Jurisprudence, The Need 
for an Advisory Committee on the Rules of Evidence, and Suggestions for Selective 
Revision of the Rules, 60 GEO. WASH. L. REv. 857 (1992) (an Advisory Committee 
on the Rules of Evidence should be created to systematically overhaul the rules, 
including the residual hearsay exceptions); Michael L. Seigel, Rationalizing Hear· 
say: A Proposal for a Best Evidence Hearsay Rule, 72 B.U. L. REV. 893 (1992) (the 
existing rules are irrational and undermine respect for the legal system; proposing 
a rule that incorporates the preference for in-court testimony, but allows admission 
of hearsay "that, by its very nature . . . is sometimes the best evidence of its 
assertive content"); Eleanor Swift, A Foundation Fact Approach to Hearsay, 75 
CALIF. L. REV. 1339 (1987) (hearsay analysis should focus on the foundation wit-
ness to provide evidence about the circumstances surrounding the declaration rath-
er than specific, fact-laden exceptions); Paul J. Brysh, Comment, Abolish the Rule 
Against Hearsay, 35 U. PITI'. L. REV. 609, 621-28 (1974) (the expected error from 
admitting hearsay is low, so should be admitted unless the jury will assign it at 
least twice its real weight). See generally Christopher B. Mueller, Post·Modern 
Hearsay Reform: The Importance of Complexity, 76 MINN. L. REV. 367 (1992), for 
an incisive review of the leading critiques of the hearsay rules and proposals for 
change, and a proposal for reform of his own. 
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proposals tend to focus on establishing a simple overarching 
framework for admission of hearsay and eliminating the many 
exceptions. However, other evidence experts oppose "over-sim-
plifying" the hearsay rules and persuasively argue that com-
plexity and detail is needed for predictability and consisten-
cy.189 
Although some of these proposals point out fruitful direc-
tions for hearsay treatment, creating a specific exception for 
threat hearsay in domestic homicide cases seems more viable. 
While courts might admit future threat evidence under these 
broad proposed rule changes, it is unlikely that such compre-
hensive revisions will be enacted. A specific, new exception is 
also more workable in that it would clearly instruct courts on 
the priority of this evidence and greatly reduce the opportunity 
of variable applicatipn. Further, legislative and judicial recog-
nition that these victims words should be heard may be a fac-
tor in stemming domestic violence and domestic homicide. 
Commentators have argued for promulgation of new hear-
say exceptions for statements by child sexual abuse victims190 
and for statements of witnesses whose unavailability has been 
procured by the accused. 191 These also may serve as useful 
models for analysis and creation of a future threat exception, 
189. Mueller, supra note 188. 
First, lawyers have to prepare for trial and know what 
they are up against . . . Second, it is not clear that judg-
es will perfonn better without rules to apply . . . Trial 
judges may need rules of some sort to deal wisely with 
hearsay. It is one thing for Judge Weinstein, who is both 
a scholar and an extraordinary jurist, to claim judges 
work better without rules, and quite another to suppose 
most judges can do so. Rules also invite a second look by 
appellate courts, which probably contributes to the devel-
opment of sound doctrine and corrects some mistakes . . . 
Finally, even discretionary rules will produce doctrinal 
complexity unless they grant judges essentially complete 
discretion. Id. at 397 (citations omitted). 
190. See, e.g., Marks, supra note 73; Sharon Kennedy, Note, Idaho v. Wright: 
The Confrontation Clause Limits on the Admissibility of Hearsay Evidence in Child 
Abuse Cases, 59 UMKC LAw REV. 1093 (1991). 
191. See, e.g., David J. Tess, Losing the Right to Confront: Defining Waiver to 
Better Address a Defendant's Actions and Their Effects on a Witness, 27 U. MICH. 
J.L. REF. 877 (1994). 
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and so are discussed in Part IIIB, infra. 
A. COMPREHENSIVE REFORM PRoPOSALS 
1. The "Best Evidence" Rule 
One interesting, broad proposal calls for replacing the 
existing hearsay rules by a ''best evidence" hearsay standard in 
which there is a general rule of preference for in-court testimo-
ny, but all hearsay is admitted when the declarant is unavail-
able. 192 In this proposal, "[h]earsay is the 'best evidence' 
when the declarant is physically unavailable, as by reason of 
death .... "193 According to this theory, in many cases the 
party offering "hearsay evidence is driven by necessity, not a 
desire to gain an unfair tactical advantage,"194 so the system 
should not operate to block hearsay as such, particularly when 
no probative alternative evidence is available. In this view, "a 
rule of automatic exclusion merely shifts the disadvantage to 
the proponent, and does so to the detriment of the fact-finding 
process.,,195 The search for truth could thus be better served 
by establishing different criteria for admission/exclusion of 
hearsay evidence. Because hearsay may inherently be "the best 
evidence of its assertive content, "196 it should be admitted 
even when less preferred testimony can be given by available 
declarants. 
Although the best evidence rule may well encompass fu-
ture threat hearsay, its generality and ambiguity make it un-
likely that admission of future threats in domestic homicide 
cases would survive a constitutional challenge. Some crucial 
issues remain unresolved under this approach. Threat hearsay 
potentially raises confrontation clause issues that remain unre-
solved in the proposed rule. Given the nature of this evidence 
and the protections guaranteed to criminal defendants, simply 
admitting all hearsay by unavailable declarants, requiring 
192. Seigel, supra note 188, at 896. "Hearsay is admissible if it is the best evi-
dence available to the offering party from a particular declarant source, or if the 
best evidence has been or will be presented to the trier of fact." Id. at 929. 
193. Id. at 933. 
194. Id. 
195. Id. 
196. Id. at 896. 
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corroborative evidence, and then providing various limiting 
instructions to the jury may not meet the constitutional test 
for non-firmly rooted hearsay exceptions. Rather than directly 
addressing the fundamental problem, and according special 
status to victim's statements, this approach treats all hearsay 
by unavailable declarants as essentially equaL Further, the 
validity and sufficiency of threat evidence may be limited in 
this approach because in criminal cases it would be necessary 
to corroborate hearsay before it could support a conviction.197 
It is not clear what would constitute adequate corroboration 
under this proposal, although support by other testimonial or 
circumstantial evidence may be enough. In any case, adoption 
of such a broad rule would probably not lead to the necessary 
changes in how the legal system handles domestic violence and 
homicide. 
2. Foundation Fact Approach 
In an approach that that has been characterized as "[o]ne 
of the most striking and original proposals on hearsay re-
form,"198 Eleanor Swift argues that hearsay should be admis-
sible after a showing of "foundation facts" that would enable a 
jury to evaluate the hearsay intelligently. 199 According to 
Swift, the current hearsay doctrine errs in excluding relevant 
information that would help the trier of fact. As she puts it, 
the "foundation fact approach admits hearsay when the propo-
nent produces foundation facts about the circumstances sur-
rounding a statement that allow the trier of fact to assess the 
reliability of the statement for itself.,,2°O Essentially, the foun-
dation witness testifies as to the circumstances in which the 
declarant's statement was made and positively identifies the 
declarant. 201 
The foundation fact approach obligates the pro-
197. Seigel, supra note 188, at 942. 
198. Mueller, supra note 188, at 402. 
199. Swift, supra note 188, at 1355. 
200. [d. at 1390. 
201. [d. at 1391. 
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ponent of hearsay to produce a foundation wit-
ness knowledgeable about the circumstances 
affecting the declarant's process of perceiving, 
remembering, and making a statement about a 
relevant event. This witness serves as the source 
of information for the trier's evaluation and is 
subject to cross-examination by the oppo-
nent.202 
Swift cites cases in which "a declarant's description of her 
husband's or boyfriend's threat is offered in the prosecution of 
the husbandlboyfriend for the declarant's subsequent murder" 
as examples of how the "adjusted foundation" would affect 
hearsay rulings. 203 In the two cases she cites, both involved 
testimony that the victim had described "a telephone conversa-
tion with defendant ... in which she told [him] she intended to 
get an annulment and he replied he would kill her if she left 
him.,,204 In one case, this evidence was admitted as a present 
sense impression, and in the other it was not, because too 
much time had elapsed.205 According to Swift, under the 
foundation fact approach both statements would be admissible, 
because "[i]n both cases, the declarants describe the context in 
which they perceived and remembered the threat... The 
foundation witness in each case could testify about the circum-
stances at the time each declarant made her statement. More-
over, in each case, the foundation witness ... could have quali-
fied as an identification witness."206 
This proposed comprehensive revision of hearsay might 
well result in inclusion of much threat evidence, as Professor 
Swift's examples indicate. However, even she acknowledges 
that the likelihood of such a "radical" proposal being adopted is 
unlikely.207 Within the narrow framework of a new categori-
cal exception, these principles may provide guidance in devel-
oping a workable exception that admits threat hearsay without 
violating the constitutional rights of the defendant. 
202. Id. at 1392. 
203. Id. at 1402 n.206. 
204. Swift, supra note 188, at 1402, quoting People v. Green, 609 P.2d 468, 480 
(1980). 
205. Id. at 1402. 
206. Id. 
207. Id. at 1428. 
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B. PROPOSED THREAT EXCEPTION TO THE HEARSAY RULE 
In general, courts have used the residual hearsay excep-
tions to expand hearsay exceptions in particular areas.208 
Evolution of the catchall exceptions to admit previously exclud-
ed hearsay tends to argue for formulating a new categorical ex-
ception. That is, "[o]nce it becomes evident that the residual 
exception is being used repeatedly to cover a certain type of 
hearsay, such as out-of-court statements of child victims of 
sexual assault, an Advisory Committee should consider either 
creating a new exception, or labeling the evidence as inadmis-
sible hearsay.,,209 In part, this is because "the stare decisis ef-
fect of the residual exception is limited to the facts of individ-
ual cases,,210 and "clarity and certainty in the Rules [of Evi-
dence] is critically important ... Careful revision will not un-
dermine, but, rather, enhance the certainty of the Rules, given 
the current state of confusion surrounding many of them.,,211 
Although courts do use the exception in the context of 
threat hearsay in domestic homicide cases, it is not "used re-
peatedly" as in the child sex abuse and procurement of witness 
unavailability cases.212 Courts more commonly seem to be 
modifying the state-of-mind exception· to admit previously 
inadmissible threat and fear hearsay in domestic homicide 
cases.213 Thus, the same argument may apply. That is, the 
Advisory Committee should create a new exception in order to 
reestablish clarity and certainty in the Rules and reduce confu-
sion in this area. 
208. See generally Becker & Orenstein, supra note 188. 
209. [d. at 909. 
210. [d., citing JACK B. WEINSTEIN & MARGARET A. BERGER, 4 WEINSTEIN'S EVI-
DENCE: COMMENTARY ON RULES OF EVIDENCE FOR THE UNITED STATES COURTS AND 
STATE COURTS (Supp. 1991). 
211. [d. 
212. See discussion in Parts IC-D, supra. 
213. See discussion in Part IIG, supra. 
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1. Constitutional Limitations 
Any new hearsay exception is by definition not "firmly 
rooted" in the law, so it must meet certain constitutional re-
quirements in a criminal case. The Sixth Amendment guaran-
tees that "[iJn all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy 
the right... to be confronted with the witnesses against 
him.,,214 Although this does not bar admission of all hearsay 
in criminal prosecutions, it does add additional constraints. 
The U.S. Supreme Court has held that, when a declarant is 
unavailable, unless the hearsay statement fits into a "firmly 
rooted" exception it must provide certain "particularized guar-
antees of trustworthiness."215 
The Court has not specified exactly what constitutes such 
particularized guarantees. However, external corroborating 
evidence is not sufficient; the trustworthiness must be some-
how intrinsic to the statement itself.216 Thus, to provide a 
"particularized guarantee" in domestic homicide cases, threat 
hearsay could be admitted subject to a preliminary determin-
ation that a pattern of threats and violence existed in the rela-
tionship, and that the circumstances and content of the 
victim's statement support an inference that she was telling 
the truth. 
2. Proposed Rule 804(b)(7)217 
A hearsay exception that would admit threat and abuse 
statements by a domestic homicide victim could take many 
forms. One reasonable approach was presented to the Califor-
nia Assembly, in the form of a bill to amend the California 
Evidence code by creating a new exception to the hearsay 
rule,218 which was substantially modified before enact-
214. U.S. CONST. amend. VI. 
215. Ohio v. Roberts, 448 U.S. 56, 66 (1980). 
216. [d. 
217. Proposed Rule 804(b)(6) has been promUlgated and distributed for comment 
by the Rules Advisory Committee, so the rule proposed here would be Rule 
804(b)(7). 
218. The bill, AB 2068, proposed the following rule: 
1360. Evidence of a statement by a declarant is not made 
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ment.219 I propose an exception similar to the California rule, 
with certain modifications, as follows: 
804(b)(7). A statement by a declarant is not 
made inadmissible by the hearsay rule if the 
following conditions are met: 
(A) The declarant is deceased and was the 
inadmissible by the hearsay rule if all the following condi-
tions are met: 
(a) The statement purports to narrate, describe, or explain 
an act, condition, or event purportedly perceived by the 
declarant. 
(b) The act, condition, or event referred to in subdivision 
(a) is the infliction or threat of physical harm upon the 
declarant against whom the statement is offered. 
(c) The party against whom the statement is offered has 
been held civilly liable for, or has been convicted of or 
has entered a plea of no contest to any crime based upon, 
any incident of infliction or threat of infliction of physical 
harm upon the declarant. 
219. As enacted, the rule states as follows:(a) Evidence of a statement by a 
declarant is not made inadmissible by the hearsay rule if all of the following con-
ditions are met: 
(1) The statement purports to narrate, describe, or explain 
the infliction or threat of physical injury upon the declar-
ant. 
(2) The declarant is unavailable as a witness pursuant to 
Section 240. 
(3) The statement was made at or near the time of the 
infliction or threat of physical injury. Evidence of state-
ments made more than five years before the filing of the 
current action or proceeding shall be inadmissible under 
this section. 
(4) The statement was made under circumstances that 
would indicate its trustworthiness. 
(5) The statement was made in writing, was electronically 
recorded, or made to a law enforcement official. 
(b) For purposes of paragraph (4) of subdivision (a), cir-
cumstances relevant to the issue of trustworthiness in-
clude, but are not limited to, the following: 
(1) Whether the statement was made in contemplation of 
pending or anticipated litigation in which the declarant 
was interested. 
(2) Whether the declarant has a bias or motive for fabri-
cating the statement, and the extent of any bias or mo-
tive. 
(3) Whether the statement is corroborated by evidence 
other than statements that are admissible only pursuant 
to this section. 
CALIF. EVID. CODE § 1370 (West Supp. 1997). 
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spouse or domestic partner or former spouse or 
domestic partner of the person against whom 
the statement is offered. 
(B) The statement narrates, describes, or ex-
plains an act, condition, event or series of events 
perceived by the declarant, or the statement 
purports to express the declarant's belief con-
cerning an act, condition, event or series of 
events. 
(C) The act, condition, or event or series of 
events referred to in subdivision (B) is the inflic-
tion or threat of physical harm upon the declar-
ant by the party against whom the statement is 
offered. 
(D) The party against whom the statement is 
offered has been held civilly liable for, or has 
been convicted of or has entered a plea of no 
contest to any crime based upon, infliction or 
threat of infliction of physical harm upon the 
declarant, or the court determines, in a hearing 
conducted outside the presence of the jury, that 
the party against whom the statement is offered 
has inflicted or threatened to inflict physical 
harm upon the declarant within five years prior 
to the hearing. 
(E) The court finds, in a hearing conducted out-
side the presence of the jury, that the time, 
content, and circumstances of the statement 
provide particularized guarantees of trustworthi-
ness. In making this determination, the court 
will consider (1) declarant's personal knowledge 
of the underlying events and motivation to 
speak the truth, (2) whether the declarant re-
canted the statement before death, the nature 
and character of the statement, (3) the relation-
ship between declarant and the party against 
whom the statement is offered, and (4) the rela-
tionship between declarant and the testifying 
witness. 
Under this proposed rule, the domestic homicide victim's 
out-of-court statements will be generally admissible against 
the accused spouse or domestic partner. Unlike the California 
proposed and enacted rules, Subdivision A specifically limits 
the exception to statements of the victim in a domestic homi-
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cide prosecution. 
Subdivision B would allow a victim's statements concern-
ing incidents of threats and violence to be admitted.220 Unlike 
the California proposed and enacted rules, this rule would 
additionally permit admission of the victim's statements of fear 
and belief that her partner is going to kill her, even absent 
explicit threats by the accused, based on her perception of the 
overall pattern of abuse and threat in the relationship. 
The California proposed rule conditioned admissibility on 
prior civil liability or a criminal conviction or plea based on 
infliction or threat of physical harm on the declarant.221 The 
California rule as enacted does not require a prior conviction 
or plea, but requires that the statement be recorded or made to 
a law enforcement officer at or near the time of the infliction 
or threat of physical harm. 222 
Both of these requirements unnecessarily restrict utility of 
the exception. In the majority of cases involving declarations 
by domestic homicide victims, there has been no prior legal 
determination of threatening or abusive incidents.223 Rarely 
do the victims write down, record, or report the threat or inju-
ry to law enforcement personnel. She tells her doctor, her law-
yer, her mother, her . sister, her best friend. Cumulative evi-
dence by various witnesses can reliably establish the pattern of 
threats and violence in the relationship.224 This pattern can 
presumably be extrapolated to the many hearsay rulings never 
recorded on appeal. Because of these discrepancies, the rule I 
220. Both the proposed and enacted California rules reach beyond the marital 
homicide context to situations in which prior threat or infliction of harm to the 
declarant can be shown. For example, under the proposed rule, if a parent or 
child has been abused and later killed, their words also would be admissible un-
der the proposed rule. Certain non-domestic homicides would also meet the re-
quirements of this exception. Under the enacted rule, the statements of any dece-
dent who had been subjected to threats or violence and who meets the other re-
quirements would be admissible; this raises other questions about the constitution-
al "indicia of reliability. n 
221. See note 211, supra. 
222. CALIF. EVID. CODE § 1370(a)(3), (5) (West Supp. 1997). 
223. See, e.g., Part IB and cases discussed in Part II, supra. 
224. The no-contest plea by O.J. Simpson in the prior attack on Nicole Brown 
Simpson was unusual. Most incidents of domestic violence are never reported, and 
those that do rarely get to court. 
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propose broadens the condition in Subdivision D to let the 
court make a preliminary determination that harm or threats 
of harm were inflicted on the declarant by the accused, but 
limits the permissible time frame. Thus, my proposed rule 
would admit statements by the many domestic violence victims 
who do not pursue complaints against their abusers prior to 
being killed and who do not record the threats, yet still provide 
reasonable protections for the accused. 
Creating a new exception for threat hearsay raises con-
frontation clause issues that must be addressed by a determi-
nation that the statement bears adequate "indicia of reliabili-
ty."225 The reliability requirement can be met where the 
statement either falls within a firmly rooted hearsay exception 
or is supported by a showing of "particularized guarantees of 
trustworthiness,"226 shown by a totality of the circumstances 
surrounding the declaration, which would indicate that the 
declarant is particularly worthy of belief and that "adversarial 
testing would add little to its reliability."227 
The relatively narrow application of this exception as well 
as the inquiry into indicia of reliability required by Subdivision 
E would address the confrontation clause issues. I have argued 
here that the victim of domestic violence has unique knowledge 
about the abuser's potential for violence that should be accord-
ed special status as the ''best evidence" available and as neces-
sary information for the trier of fact. If accepted, this status in 
itself should provide the basis for a showing of constitutional 
reliability. Further, a number of courts have applied tests 
similar to that set out in Subdivision E to verify the trustwor-
thiness of such statements in domestic homicide cases under 
the catchall hearsay exception, and these admissions have 
survived constitutional challenge.228 
225. Ohio v. Roberts, 448 U.S. 56, 57 (1980). 
226. [d. 
227. Idaho v. Wright, 497 U.S. 805, 822 (1990). 
228. See discussion in Part IIG, supra. 
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IV. CONCLUSION 
Currently, courts apply the hearsay rule inconsistently in 
domestic homicide cases. Some courts seem to stretch the ex-
ceptions past permissible bounds, while others apply the hear-
say rule and its exceptions strictly, finding no applicable excep-
tions for the victim's statements about her abuser. Courts 
admit threat, fear, and abuse hearsay under a patchwork of 
exceptions, while they exclude vital portions of the victim's 
words. Courts of appeal regularly hold such hearsay to have 
been erroneously admitted. These cases cry out for a new ap-
proach, one that recognizes the unique situation facing victims 
of domestic violence and homicide. Proposed Rule 804(b)(7) 
offers a possibility for change, one that will allow the victims' 
words finally to be heard. 
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